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ABSTRACT. Our aim was to analyze the effects of firms’
innovative behavior on their employees’ salaries in the Spanish
manufacturing industry. We found a premium in the wage paid
by innovative firms, regardless of size. However, when taking
company size into account, we found that the effect of
innovations was greater in small-medium enterprises (SME),
contrary to what was expected. The inferences of the models
estimated suggest that the higher the market concentration
the weaker the appropriability regime, especially for SMEs.
However, at the same time, a firm’s innovations reduce the
impact of market concentration on wages, making innovating
firms more autonomous than non-innovating ones. Even more,
to be able to innovate, firms have to isolate their employees’
salaries from the product market. These results hold regard-
less of firm’s size, but have a greater impact on the small-
medium group of firms. Finally, our analysis backs the
assumption that salaries in both large and small-medium firms
are generated by two distinct economic regimes, supporting
the proposition that an SME is not simply a scaled-down large
firm.
 
1.  The determinants of wage premiums
Several studies have addressed the issue of wage
determinants. Their results suggest that salaries
paid by SMEs follow a differentiated pattern in
comparison to large firms. Nickel et al. (1994)
found that (1) workers in large firms are better
placed to extract quasi-rents stemming from a
firm’s competitive strength in the product market,
but this has nothing to do with unions, and (2)
while internal factors play a role in determining
wages, there appears to be no marked differences
in their importance between SME’s and large
firms. Later, however, Lever and Werkhooven
(1996) also found that a firm’s competitive
strengths have a positive impact on wages, but,
contrary to the inferences of Nickel et al. (1994),
the weight of internal factors in SMEs was sub-
stantially lower. Furthermore, they found that
market concentration increases the impact of a
large firm’s internal factors on wages.
These contradictory and surprising findings
warrant further research on the determinants of
wages in SMEs in comparison to large firms. In
this piece of work we address this issue as well
as analyze the innovative behavior of Spanish
firms and its impact on wages paid by SMEs and
large firms. The Spanish economy contains a high
percentage of SMEs and is currently experiencing
significant changes in the business climate,
making it an exciting subject for study concerning
the firm’s role in the process of wealth generation
and effective political measures to promote
company growth. A recent initiative of the Spanish
Ministry of Industry and Energy – hereafter
MINER – to construct panel data with company-
level data on more than 2,000 manufacturing firms
allows us to test theory in order to gain insight
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1and, thereby, design effective policies that foster
economic growth.
In general, Spanish industry has not engaged in
much innovative activity. However, since Spain
joined the European Economic Community (EEC)
in 1986, firms have been led to change their
strategic behavior in many cases. In fact, by 1992
45 per cent of the firms had introduced some kind
of innovation compared with figures of around 15
per cent in 1986, as indicated by the Central de
Balances survey conducted by the Bank of Spain
(Labeaga and MartÌnez-Ros, 1994). Traditionally,
Spanish industry has primarily been composed of
small-medium firms with a low percentage of
innovative activity. However, during the 1980’s
companies developed some technical changes
(mainly in process innovation, according to data)
which possibly affected the composition of their
labor force as well as their internal capacity to
compete. Entry into the EEC may be considered
to have changed the competitive business
environment, a new situation that required that
companies to devise innovative strategies to be
more competitive and gain market share in both
domestic and foreign markets.
We had six aims in our work. First we were
interested in checking the existence of a differen-
tial wage stemming from quasi-rents in innovating
firms. Next we looked at the question of the
existence of a confounding variable (Anderson et
al., 1980): firm size. Third we assessed the impact
of firms’ innovation by type: product only, process
only and both simultaneously. Fourth we analyzed
if the wage premium paid by innovative firms
depends on the firm’s competitive strength on the
market and its structure. Fifth, we checked
whether the human resources of innovative firms
were more firm-specific than those of non-innov-
ative firms, and, therefore, whether the wage
premium went to them. Lastly, on the basis of the
above differences between large firms and SMEs
we needed to look at whether the salaries paid by
both groups were rooted in different economic
regimes.
This paper is organized as follows. In the fol-
lowing section we present the neoclassical model
and elaborate our theoretical framework linking
the former to contemporary research on innova-
tion, firms’ competitive heterogeneity and Small
Business theories. In the third section we discuss
the development of our research design in order
to find answers to our inquiries. In the fourth
section we present our findings and proceed to
discuss their implications in the fifth section.
Lastly, we present our main conclusions.
2.  Theoretical framework
Wages’ main determinants when alike firms
compete in homogeneous markets
As Lever and Werkhooven (1996) did, we start
from the wage determinants equation proposed by
Nickel and Wadhwani (1990), Holmlund and
Zetterberg (1991) and Nickell et al. (1994). This
model presumes that wages are determined
through negotiation between firms and the existing
work force at the beginning of the period – it is a
static model – and that the employment level is
set by the firm. In addition, there is imperfect
competition in the product market – an oligopo-
listic market structure is supposed offering
identical products. Output demand is subject to
exogenous shocks, which are unknown at the stage
of bargaining. The firm sets the output price and
the employment level after the wage negotiations
and after the size of the shock is identified, so that
profits are maximized. Finally, it is presumed that
the trade union maximizes the expected income
for their members, who are the existing
employees.
The bargaining model results in the following
wage determinants (see Nickel et al., 1994 for
details):
wi =  wi(InternalFactorsi, ExternalFactorsi, 
MarketFactorsi, BPoweri)
Where wi is the firm wage rate per employee
and its determinants can be grouped into four
classes: firm’s internal factors, external factors,
market factors, and employees bargaining power,
respectively. Firm’s internal factors are composed
by pj, the market price, fi, the level of production
efficiency, ki, capital stock, and ni, the level of
employment. Those internal factors, fi, ki, and ni,
are nothing more than the marginal revenue
product per employee, and pj the value of one unit
produced and sold. Consequently we can aggre-
gate them and use the value of labor productivity
or value added per employee as its empirical
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2construct. Hence, a significant impact of internal
factors (value of labor productivity, pti) on wages
implies that they adapt to firm’s performance
(¶wi/¶pti > 0). As Lever and Werkhooven point
out, this produces stable employment as well as
change in relative wages rates (1996, p. 94). 
Firm’s external factors are composed of: umi,
the union membership, w, the aggregate wage, u,
the aggregate unemployment rate, b, the unem-
ployment subsidies relative to the average wage,
and z, any factor representing the reducing com-
petition for jobs among the unemployed. We use
these external factors as controls in the estima-
tion process so we only include the aggregate
unemployment rate with a negative expected sign
over salaries (¶wi/¶uj > 0). Contrary to the impact
of internal factors on wages, a high impact of
external factors implies that wages adapt to the
overall performance of the economy. Comparing
both effects on wages, a higher impact from the
internal factors is considered favorable over
external ones. 
Firm-market factors are msi, its market share in
physical terms, msi = qi/å"jqj, and mi, the conjec-
tural variations. Both variables, msi and  mi,
measure the degree of competition in the market:
the higher the firm’s market share, the less rivalry
it has in the market (¶wi/¶msi > 0), and if firms
do not take into account rivals’ reactions to their
competitive moves, competition will be greater,
and the other way round (¶wi/¶mi = (?)). The final
factor is employees’ bargaining power, bi,
measured as the union power (¶wi/¶bi > 0).
Although the firm constitutes the unit of
analysis in microeconomics, the level of interest
has typically been the industry. In neoclassical
theory firms in the same industry are assumed to
have equal access to the most efficient techniques
as changes occurs in relative prices as well as alike
access to the market, so that they are interested
in explaining differences among industries, not
among firms in the same industry. Below we
introduce heterogeneity among firms in any
market and see how it could affect wages.
Wages and firm’s innovations
Since we are interested in analyzing the effect of
firm’s innovations – an internal factor – on wages,
we must introduce them in the model with care,
because it is expected that innovations affect
salaries in some ways: the level of production
efficiency, fi, firm i market j price, pij, and firm
competitive position. We focus our interest on
innovations rather than Research and
Development (R&D) because the former is the
result of later conceptualization in which SMEs
are less likely to answer in a questionnaire, pro-
ducing, as a result, a bias in the measurement of
R&D (Kleinknecht, 1989; Scheirer, 1991). Hence
we introduce innovations in the basic model as a
treatment assuming that innovations make a shift
in the slope of the innovative-firm’s wages
equation relative to the non-innovative one. Thus
we expect that wages will be positively affected
by innovation, ¶wi/¶I > 0, so that wages in inno-
vative firms will be greater than in non-innovative
firms, wI > wN.
Firm size manifests different possibilities con-
cerning access to resources. Consequently, the
effect of innovations on wages will be different,
depending upon the capacity of the firm to appro-
priate the rents stemming from innovation. In
short, the difference between large innovative and








innovations are a necessary but not sufficient
condition to earn rents from the product market:
firms need resources to transform innovations into
rents as well as competitive strength that will
possibly vary with firm’s size.
Wages, innovations, and different firms 
competing in an heterogeneous market 
In the strategic management literature, the
resource-based view of the firm (hereafter RBV)
suggests that firms increase their competitive
advantage by improving production efficiency
through intangible resources, company assets and
capabilities (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). As
in the case of the neoclassical approach, the RBV
of the firm suggests that product market rents stem
from imperfect competition, but rather than being
based on identical firms marketing the very same
products, it is rooted on different firms marketing
imperfect substitutes. Firms are not identical
because there is no strategic factor market where
the necessary resources can be bought (assets as
well as both individual and organizational skills)
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3to duplicate a winning market strategy, although
in several cases there might be strategic substitutes
(Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Hence, resources can
be imitated only imperfectly, and since firms have
access to different sets of resources, their market
strategies will also be different.
In this framework, market share, msi = qi/å"jqj,
is no longer an external factor but the result of
the firm’s strategic decisions: its achieved level of
product differentiation, cost position and other
marketing variables, as well as their interaction
with those of its competitors in the same market.
In addition, the effect of the firm’s strategic deci-
sions is mediated by some market parameters:
marketing variable elasticities, industry elasticity
of price, and the effect of cross-elasticities
between firms in the same industry (Karnani,
1984, p. 370). As a result, firms with a compara-
tive superior cost position, differentiation, or both,
will enjoy a larger market share, which, in turn,
leads to higher profitability. (In fact, in theory,
market share and profitability are a simultaneous
result.) In this case, firm’s market share depends
positively on its competitive strength (positively
on its level of absolute demand and negatively on
its absolute cost position, both aspects closely
related to the quality of firm-specific resources),
given some industry parameters, and negatively on
its rivals’ strength. As Karnani points out, “a
higher level of absolute demand can be achieved
in several different ways, such as better product
quality, more convenient distribution, and better
customer service” (1983, p. 79; 1984, p. 370). 
As a result, the distribution of firms between
Large and SMEs is an endogenous solution that
depends on some industry-specific parameters:
market elasticities on marketing variables, price
cross-elasticities between products of different
firms in the same market, and the economies-of-
scale effect and industry price-elasticity. Hence, in
the wage determinants formulation, a firm’s market
factors should be modified to take into account
heterogeneity in the firm’s offer, so that salaries
will be a positive function of the relative level of
absolute differentiation position and a negative
function of its relative absolute cost position, a
combination that is both valued by customers and
superior to that of its competitors – a firm’s
relative share – sharel – being its empirical con-
struct, (dwi/dshareli > 0 (Acs and Audretsch,
1988). Nevertheless, this effect will be mediated
by some industry parameters.
Firm’s competitive position, market 
concentration, and the ease of innovation
Mediating factors are those variables that make a
firm’s competitive strength and innovations more
or less influencing. By appropriability (Teece,
1986) we mean the innovators’ ability to protect
their innovations from imitation and, conse-
quently, to reap profits stemming from their
innovative strategy and, thereby, appropriate the
rents stemming from their innovations. This ability
will be associated with a firm’s access to the
market, a good position in market channels and,
a high value of its trademarks. Opportunity con-
ditions refer to the ease of innovation by would-
be innovators, and are related to the innovation
potential of each technology and, thus, are
industry-specific. Appropriability conditions are
more important in markets with comparatively
more opportunities of innovating.
As Levin et al. (1985) demonstrated, concen-
tration measures are proxies of both theoretical
constructs and the effects of the respective sector
are proxies of opportunity. By using a measure of
market concentration – average markup, avgmbe,
will be its empirical construct – along with the
sector’s effects – captured by industry dummy
variables – we were able to split the effect of the
appropriability and opportunity conditions. We
expect that market appropriability theoretical con-
struct will have a positive effect on the wage
premium earned by employees and interact with
firm’s internal factors. In other words, innovating
firms will not be able to reap the benefits
stemming from their innovative activity if they
compete in regimes of weak appropriability
(Teece, 1986), whereas firms competing in settings
where innovating activity is easier will attempt
innovation more frequently, and, consequently, the
wages paid to their employees will be higher.
Furthermore, we expect that the greater the market
concentration, the larger the average markup and
the less interested both types of firms will be in
innovating, a negative interaction that Schumpeter
(1942) suggested.
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4Heterogeneity in firms’ innovative behavior
Firm’s size is the result of managerial decisions
intended to develop and accumulate company
capabilities and focused on finding new ways in
which they can be used (Penrose, 1959). As firms
get larger, however, their learning and adaptation
costs increase, and, consequently, Cyert and
Kumar’s model predicts that firms will change
their marketing and organizational strategies over
the product life-cycle from strategies emphasizing
entrepreneurial and marketing function – product
innovation – early in the company’s life-cycle over
those focused on cost reduction and process
innovation (1996a).
As firms become larger due to implementation
of successful competitive strategies, they earn
quasi-rents stemming from imperfection in the
product and/or input markets that result in
imperfection in their internal labor markets as
employees share the organizational quasi-rents.
Nevertheless, as they get larger, their learning and
adaptation costs also increase, thus causing a
change in the way they compete. As firms grow
they tend to employ product-innovation strategies,
IP, but when they actually become large, they shift
toward the implementation of cost reduction
strategies, IC. In short, we expect employee wages
of innovative firms to be higher than those of non-
innovative firms, even though the determinants of
the wage premium in small firms are different than
those in large ones. To be precise we expect that
the impact of product-innovation on wages will be
greater on small-medium firms than in the large
ones, ¶wi
S/¶IP > ¶wi
L/¶IP, and the reverse effect
will be found when it comes to process-innova-
tion, ¶wi
S/¶IC < ¶wi
L/¶IC. On the other hand, we
expect that simultaneously performing product and
process innovation, due to its complexity, has a
greater impact on larger firms’ wages than in the
SMEs group, ¶wi
L/¶(IC & IP) > ¶wi
S/¶(IC & IP).
Firm-specific resources and the wages paid by
Large and SMEs
Whereas strategic marketing decisions aim to
maintain and improve the value of firm-specific
resources, the company’s actual capabilities and
assets make it possible to implement its marketing
decisions. Thus, an innovative firm’s strategy must
be based on an accumulated set of firm-specific
resources and on developing new ones to fill the
gap between the level of the firm’s resources and
those needed to implement the strategies
(Abernathy and Clark, 1985). Cyert and Kumar
(1996b) showed that a firm’s marketing strategy
(“product market”, in their words) and organiza-
tional designs are closely related when it comes to
seeking a competitive advantage.
As Doeringer and Piore (1971) and Aoki (1984)
have shown, for a firm’s employees to develop
firm-specific skills they must carry out long-term
idiosyncratic investments. In order to encourage
employees to invest in firm-specific skills, the
internal labor market must be isolated from the
external labor market and, therefore, from current
company performance. Thus, we expect that a
firm’s internal-factors will have a greater positive
impact on the wage premium earned by employees
working for small firms than on the wage of
employees working for the large ones. This would
suggest that SMEs specialize in volatile environ-
ments not because of any lack of intellectual
ability to select and memorize administrative
procedures, but because they are unable to devise
innovative strategies based on, and intended to
develop, new, idiosyncratic firm’s capabilities.
Wages in Large and SMEs are set by different
economic regimens
The above arguments suggest that there are
reasons for SMEs being something more than a
miniature large company. Casson (1995, p. 124)
put forward the following hypothesis: “the link
between a general theory of the firm and small
firm economics comes from identifying small
firms as the firms that specialize in operating in
volatile environments.” Even though we agree
with Casson’s answer, we disagree with his
causality chain because he appears to consider
SME capabilities to be static – in Casson’s model,
volatility comes from the difficulty to foresee
demand conditions – although, in reality, volatility
is partially controlled by a firm’s innovative strate-
gies (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Cyert and Kumar,
1996). According to the latter, “economizing
requires not only adaptation in the passive sense
of the firm taking as given the random arrival of
the ‘shocks’ but that the firm also consciously
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5generates these shocks in a pro-active way.”
(1996a, p. 220).
Along the same lines as Penrose (1959), Aoki
(1984), Piore and Sabel (1984), Teece (1986),
Casson (1995) and Cyert and Kumar (1996), we
suggest that large firms become large because they
develop decision-making procedures, firm-specific
resources and capabilities embedded into routines.
Small firms remain small because they are unable
to develop these intangible and firm-specific
resources. This proposition differs from Casson’s
only in that we have not taken the intellectual
qualities of a firm’s management team as a given
– we could interpret these intellectual qualities as
a measure of those routines developed inside the
firm – but as a dynamic learning and adaptation
process led by innovative managerial strategies.
SMEs do not specialize in volatile environments
because they lack the intellectual qualities required
to select and memorize administrative procedures
but rather because they are unable to devise
innovative strategies based on (and intended to
develop) new company capabilities, a fact that
frequently keeps them small – these are precisely
the intellectual qualities mentioned in Casson’s
model.
As a consequence we shall propose that the
determinants of wage premium must be different
in small and large enterprises since as they grow,
they change their cumulative set of capabilities
and hence, the costs of learning from their envi-
ronment and adapting to this new information. To
the extent to which wages in small and large firms
stem from different technological regimes, a dif-
ference in the determinants’ parameters that affect
wages in small- and large-firm would offer support
for Winter’s (1986) and Casson’s (1995)
hypotheses. The model of this two-regime case
can be written as:






3.  Research design
Research questions
First question: Is there any wage premium or dif-
ferential salary stemming from quasi-rents in
innovating firms, wI > wN? 
Second question: If the answer to the previous
inquiry is affirmative, is the wage differential
affected by firm’s size? Is the latter a confounding
variable? Does firm’s size affect the impact of








Third Question: Do large and small-medium
firms differ in their innovative behavior? We
expect that large enterprises carry out more
process innovations and more simultaneous
process and product innovations, and that the
impact of this type of innovations is greater than




L/¶(IC & IP) > ¶wi
S/¶(IC & IP)). The reverse is




Fourth question: Is there any interaction
between a firm’s internal factors and market
factors? Is the effect of innovation affected by the
market structure? Is it affected by the firm’s com-
petitive strength? 
Fifth question: Are the human resources of
innovative firms more firm-specific than the ones
in non-innovative firms? If the answer were
affirmative, then we would have to find that the
salaries of the formers are less affected by the
firm’s current performance than those of the
employees working for non-innovative firms; this
should be confirmed, in both SMEs and large
firms. 
Sixth and last question: On the basis of the
above differences between large firms and SMEs,
we needed to look at whether the salaries paid by
both groups were rooted in different economic
regimes. If the answer were yes, then a statisti-
cally significant difference in the parameters for
the small- and large-firm regressions would offer
support for Winter’s (1986) and Casson’s (1995)
hypotheses.
Sample and variables
The database used for this study contained
company-level information for the Spanish man-
ufacturing industry obtained from the Business
Strategic Survey (hereafter ESEE, the Spanish
acronym). These data covered the period
1990–1994 although we use another source for
calculating the aggregate unemployment rate,
namely, the annual survey of employed people,
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6Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA). The ESEE
survey consists of a panel with a different number
of firms each year. However, we considered only
the 2,188 firms that submitted data for each year.
Samples were selected by excluding observations
with missing values due to problems of data
consistency, specifically we excluded any firm
reporting zero sales and/or zero employment.
Observations for firms that did not report infor-
mation in any of the five years were also deleted.
This gave a final sample consisting of a balanced
panel with 1,306 observations available for each
period. The representative sample of the manu-
facturing industry was justified by comparing
descriptive statistics of the main variables from
the complete sample (2,188 firms) with the
reduced one (1,306 firms). We confirmed the exis-
tence of two broad groups of firms: approximately
65 percent are small and medium-firms (less than
200 workers) and 35 percent are large firms (more
than 200 workers). In the following table, we
present the definition of variables. 
Table II lists descriptive statistics for the main
variables according to size, allowing us to roughly
observe several behavioral differences between the
two groups of companies. As expected, we
observed that wages were higher in large firms
than in smaller ones. The standard deviation also
showed greater variance in remuneration within
small companies. The descriptive statistics indi-





LNWAGE Average firm wage expressed in logarithms.
Firm’s internal factors
Innovation activity
INNOVA Dummy variable takes 1 if firm innovates, 0 otherwise.
PRODUCT Dummy variable takes 1 if firm only innovates in product, 0 otherwise.
PROCESS Dummy variable takes 1 if firm only innovates in process, 0 otherwise.
BOTHINOV Dummy variable takes 1 if firm innovates in process and product at the same time, 
0 otherwise.
Labor productivity
PT Quotient between firm added value and the average number of employees: 
added value per employee.
Labour structure
SKILLED Proportion of engineers and employees in the firm with degree.
SEMI-SKILLED Proportion of semi-skilled employees in the firm.
Situational factors
SMALL Dummy variable equal to 1 when firm has less than or equal to 200 workers.
LARGE Dummy variable equal to 1 when firm has more than 200 workers.
Firm’s external factors
TAXA Sector’s average unemployment ratio.
Firm’s market factors
SHAREL Quotient between production of firm and the production of largest firm of the sector.
AVGMBE Average margin of the sector.
Interactions between firm’s 
internal and external factors
AVGMBEIN Product of AVGMBE and INNOVA
AVGMBEPT Product of AVGMBE and PT
7cated that large firms showed a greater tendency
to be engaged in innovation activities. Process and
simultaneous innovation rates were higher for
large companies whereas product innovation
appeared to be similar in both groups. It is also
worth noting that there was a higher percentage of
highly skilled workers in large firms. 
On the other hand, relative market share figures
were interesting because they showed that large
firms were better positioned market-wise, although
there was considerable heterogeneity in this group
with respect to the standard deviation. We also
observe that the unemployment ratio is larger for
SME indicating that external factors could disci-
pline the wage determination. Interestingly, the
value of the variable reflecting firm productivity
was higher in large companies, as expected,
although the mean productivity of SMEs was not
significant.
The empirical model
Our study focused on the importance of a firm’s
capabilities in wage premiums by taking into
account the varying structures of companies.
Hence, the dynamic specification can be formu-
lated as follows:
Wit = aWit – 1 + f¢Iit + d¢Eit + b¢Mit + g¢Xit + eit
(1)
Where Wit is the average wage of firm i in
period t (in natural logs); I is the firm’s internal
factors matrix containing the innovation techno-
logical variables, labor productivity, as well as the
skill composition of the labor force within the firm
at the beginning of the period (unfortunately, we
do not have information on skill composition for
the entire sample period, hence, we must assume
either that there were no changes in skills over
time or that current skills are a function of past
knowledge. Regardless of which assumption is
chosen, we can safely assume that an employee’s
initial abilities are a good approximation of his/her
skills); E represents a firm’s external factors, as
unemployment ratio; M is a matrix of the firm’s
market factors as relative market share, and aggre-
gate margin – our empirical construct of market
concentration – and, X relates to interaction
variables among firm’s internal and market
factors.  eit is a random term composed of hetero-
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TABLE II
Descriptive statistics
Variables Small-Medium (No. observ.: 3705) Large (No. observ.: 2105)
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
LNWAGE 0.893 0.416 1.355 0.348
SHAREL 0.016 0.034 0.206 0.255
PT 4.116 2.846 6.267 4.179
TAXA 0.149 0.056 0.139 0.055
AVGMBE 0.103 0.034 0.102 0.038
AVGMBEIN 0.033 0.050 0.057 0.057













8geneity effects mi and a standard mixed error term,
vit. Finally, the introduction of lagged wages
controls the dynamics in the process of wage
determination and provides some assessment of
how they affect current labor negotiations. In all
estimations, we introduce industry dummies.
It is important to notice that we assumed that
unions have no bargaining power concerning
overall employment figures in the economy but
only in firms, since this was where our specific
interest laid. In Spain, this is possible because
unions do not represent most workers, only those
who are members; in fact, union members are
insiders who have bargaining power within the
firm.
In order to test the existence of two regimes,
one for large firms and the other for SMEs, we
split the sample in these two categories. The
estimation process revealed that both types of
firms determined the wage in a different manner.
While SME firms follow the traditional equation
of wage, large firms present a novelty. They use
past wage to determine current wage, which
implies that the coefficient of Wt – 1 is 1. Such
evidence leads us to reformulate the wage equation
for large firms, passing the lagged wage to the left-
hand side and regressing the growth of wage on
the explanatory variables.
Working with panel data has an advantage
over cross-sectional analysis because unobserved
heterogeneous effects (called “fixed effects” in the
panel data) can be controlled, for example, the
ability of a manager to achieve good company
performance throughout the period. The fixed
effect parameter, mi, measures such ability and
introduces a correlation with the lagged variable
under the assumption that mi is unobservable. The
result of the correlation is that Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) or Within Group (WG) estimation
methods are inconsistent and hence, the need to
overcome the correlation problem using alterna-
tive procedures. The estimation process finally
proposed consisted of applying an alternative
Instrumental Variable (IV) developed by Arellano
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1995).
In this method the correlation between fixed
effects and lagged wage is controlled using
DWit – 2, as an instrument for lagged wage; this
variable does not contain the fixed effects. This
approach consisted of using the initial information
conditions for deriving optimal estimators in
dynamic panel data models.
4.  Findings
A descriptive analysis for the entire period,
1990–1994, yields a significant feature: on the
average, 16.5 per cent of firms carry out both
product and process innovation, 9.3 per cent
innovate only in new products and 16.6 per cent
only in new processes. However, the evolution of
these types of activities has been different. Product
innovation has experienced an increase during the
period, reaching 10 per cent in the final year
studied. This contrasts with a slight decline (from
20 to 19%) in process innovation during the same
year after a huge increase in 1991. A possible
explanation for this is that the economic reces-
sion in Spain had a greater influence on process
innovation than product innovation. This is to be
expected if we assume that the process view has
permanent effects on company profitability
The Innovative Behavior of Spanish Enterprises and Its Impact on Salaries 295
Figure 1.  Innovations by type.
9whereas the product view has only temporary
effects if other firms find it easier to replicate
product rather than process innovation.
In order to assess the effect of innovative activ-
ities on the wages paid by Spanish firms, we
analyzed employee wages for firms undertaking
some kind of innovation. Table III contains the
results of a cross-tabulation of average wage (in
natural logs) that distinguishes between innovating
versus non-innovating firms and large versus small
firms. 
Results clearly show that, on the average,
innovating firms pay higher wages than those who
do not carry out this activity, and that this differ-
ence is statistically significant at 1 per cent. When
looking at the wage differential according to firm
size, we observe that large firms pay workers more
than small ones, and that this is also statistically
significant. Table III also shows the number of
firms that performed innovative activities during
the period 1990–94, broken down according to
company size. Although the number of companies
in the sample carrying out innovative activities
was similar in small and large companies, the
proportion differed as can be seen when consid-
ering the total number of firms in each group. A
Chi square test rejects the hypothesis that the
number of innovating firms is independent of their
size (c
2 = 342.1). Consequently, we may state that
in the Spanish industrial sector, large firms exhibit
more innovative activity than small firms,
although this does not necessarily result in higher
wages if company size is not associated with the
existence of a competitive advantage due to
greater efficiency achieved from firm-specific
resources.
Surprisingly, we found that the salary difference
was greater between large firms and small ones
than between innovating and non-innovating
firms. To determine if these salary differences
were random, we performed a variance analysis
by studying the effect of innovations on the salary
paid by firms, controlling firm size. If we could
reject the null hypothesis proposing that the rela-
tionship between innovation and size is insignifi-
cant, then we should separately analyze the impact
of innovations on the wage paid by both groups of
firms, since firm’s size will be a situational factor
or proxy of other factors moderating the impact of
innovation on salaries. 
Figure 2 shows a linear-ordinal relationship
pattern. The differential effect of moving from
non-innovating to innovating on the salary
premium earned by employees depends on the
firm’s size. The incremental effect is of the same
order (positive) although less pronounced for large
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Figure 2.  Mean wage (in natural logs) by size.
TABLE III
Mean of wage by Innovation and Size. (Number of firms conducting innovating activities) 
Innovating Non-Innovating Total
Small 0.964 (1237) 0.857 (2468) 0.893 (3705)
Large 1.364 (1228) 1.344 (877) 1.355 (2105)
Total 1.163 (2465) 0.985 (3345) 1.061 (5810)
10firms. This can be seen by looking at the depar-
tures from parallelism observed in each line.
Actually, according to the F ratios of the variance
analysis, the interaction between a firm’s size and
its innovating activity was quite significant (with
an alpha level of less than 0.001).
The main findings of both wage determination
processes are summarized in Table IV. A different
wage determination is found between small-
medium and large firms. Although the wage
process differed between small-medium com-
panies and large ones, interesting conclusions may
be reached concerning the influence of innovations
on salaries. In general, innovations produced large
wages in SMEs (model I) but if we distinguish by
types of innovations (model II), we observe that
only process innovations in SMEs led to higher
salaries: If a small-medium firm improve its tech-
nological process of manufacturing, its employees’
salary increases by 0.052 units. As far as large
firms are concerned, their average salary increase
only seems to be affected by an enlargement in the
sector’s average unemployment ratio (model I¢ and
II¢); neither innovations nor firm’s market factors
were found to move the average salary paid. 
The opposite pattern is found in the SME group
where market position as well market concentra-
tion affected salaries positively: one point increase
in firm’s competitive strength augmented the
salary paid by 2 units, and increased market
concentration by 1.57. The latter seems to indicate
that employees’ salaries in SMEs are highly
affected by the firm’s competitive strength and the
competition encountered in the market. The higher
the market position, the higher the salaries; the
less competition in the product market, the higher
the wages. The unemployment ratio is the only
significant variable in both types of firms, but with
an unexpected sign in both types of firms: theory
suggests that the threat of high levels of unem-
ployment could discipline the labor market,
however we found the opposite result. This
suggests that Spanish salaries do not adapt well
to the overall performance of the economy. 
When we took into account the possible exis-
tence of an interaction between firm’s innovative
activity and market factors (models III and III¢),
we found that the impact of innovations on wages
depends on a firm’s product market structure, and
the other way around: the moderator impact of
market structure on wages depends on the firm’s
innovative activity. Hence, the short-term impact
of process innovations on the wage of the small-
medium group of firms is 0.133 minus 0.95 times
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TABLE IV
Wage determination according to firm size
a, b
Explanatory Small-Medium Large
variables No. observations: 1482 No. observations: 1684
Dependent variable
lnwage Dlnwage
Model I Model II Model III Model I¢ Model II¢ Model III¢
LNWAGEt – 1 0.274 (0.95) 0.272 (0.94) 0.281 (0.99) n.a. n.a. n.a.
INNOVA 0.025 (1.68) 0.011 (1.21)
PRODUCT 0.001 (0.06) 0.076 (1.38) 0.006 (0.39) 0.061 (2.03)
PROCESS 0.052 (2.31) 0.133 (1.99) 0.010 (0.94) 0.065 (2.34)
BOTHINOV 0.004 (0.19) 0.082 (1.40) 0.136 (1.17) 0.067 (2.38)
SKILLED 1.446 (2.79) 1.452 (2.78) 1.440 (2.80) –0.012 (0.16) –0.920 (0.15) –0.014 (0.18)
SEMI-SKILLED 0.322 (1.50) 0.341 (1.55) 0.336 (1.55) 0.043 (0.45) 0.044 (0.46) 0.040 (0.43)
SHAREL 1.973 (2.73) 2.002 (2.73) 1.966 (2.75) 0.002 (0.13) 0.001 (0.09) –0.001 (0.02)
AVGMBE 1.604 (2.13) 1.572 (2.11) 1.851 (2.13) 0.145 (1.28) 0.146 (1.28) 0.410 (2.14)
TAXA 1.684 (2.73) 1.699 (2.72) 1.579 (2.72) 0.156 (2.51) 0.156 (2.50) 0.053 (0.60)
AVGMBEIN –0.955 (1.44) –0.598 (2.26)
a All results are robust to heteroskedasticity.
b T-ratios in brackets.
11the average of AVGMBEIN, that is 0.102 (0.045
for product, and 0.114 for simultaneous product
and process innovations). To find the long-term
impact, we must divide the short-term impact by
(1 – 0.281); this results in 0.141 (0.062 for
product, and 0.158 for simultaneous product and
process innovations). For the large firms’ group
we found that the wage increase was impacted by
0.064 minus 0.598 times their average of
AVGMBEIN, that is 0.03 (0.027 for product, and
0.033 for simultaneous product and process
innovations). 
The data show that market structure negatively
affects the impact of innovations on wages. The
same innovation in a more concentrated market
produces a reduced premium on wages and this
result holds for large as well as for small-medium
firms. Nevertheless, the impact is greater for
small-medium firms than for large enterprises. In
a concentrated market small firms are poorly posi-
tioned to appropriate the quasi-rents stemming
from their innovations; in contrast, large firms
have more adequate resources to appropriate these
quasi-rents. On the other hand, the moderation
effect of market concentration is affected by a
firm’s innovative behavior. For the same level of
market concentration, innovative firms find their
impact moderated by their innovations. The results
also show that the impact of innovations on
salaries was moderated by technological oppor-
tunity conditions to a greater extent in all sectors
than in the reference sector (Leather).
To test the hypothesis that firms grow devel-
oping firm-specific resources (human resources in
this case), we need to know if employees’ salaries
are influenced by firm’s current performance –
labor productivity is its empirical construct. To
develop individual and organizational skills
specifics to the firm, the entrepreneur must isolate
the firm’s internal labor market from the product
market. To check this proposition we have to split
the original two groups of firms into four – small-
medium innovating firms, small-medium non-
innovating firms, large innovating firms, and
large non-innovating firms – since innovation
variables may be correlated with labor produc-
tivity. Table V reports the results.
We see that the average wage of large inno-
vating firms is almost not influenced by labor
productivity – the value of its parameter is reduced
and statistically insignificant – but is positively
moved by the sector’s average unemployment
ratio. In large non-innovating firms, however,
wages are affected by firm’s current performance.
In the small innovating and non-innovating groups
we observed the same pattern: while the parameter
estimated for both types of small firms are statis-
tically significant in the edge (the value of alpha
is slightly greater than 0.10), the wages in the
non-innovating group are more affected by firm’s
current performance. In fact, when comparing
large with small-medium innovating firms we
found that the wages paid by large innovating
firms were less moved by labor productivity, the
same pattern that we detected between large and
small-medium non-innovating firms. Hence, we
can hold the alternative hypothesis that firms grow
by developing firm-specific resources and that
innovating firms must have more specific
resources than non-innovating firms, and this last
result holds regardless of firm size.
Finally, we checked the existence of different
regimes in the wage determination strategy using
the Chow test and the specification in levels for
the joined estimation. Clearly, we rejected the null
hypothesis that b estimates in both regressions
were equal. This suggests that salaries in both
large and small-medium enterprises were gener-
ated by two distinct economic regimes (large
firms’ regime : wi
L = wi
L(XL: b); small-medium
firms’ regime : wi
S = wi
S(XS: a)), as Winter (1986)
and Casson (1995) argued.
5.  Discussion and implications
Spanish firms have changed their innovative
behavior since Spain became an EC member in
1986. In fact, the number of firms carrying out
some kind of innovation process was threefold by
late 1992. By that time, one out of ten Spanish
firms were involved in product innovation, almost
one and a half out of ten Spanish firms were com-
mitted to implementing process innovation, and
more than 15% were conducting both kinds of
innovation. When crossing innovative behavior
and firm size, we found interesting figures: in
terms of product innovation only, SMEs innovated
more than large firms, although the difference was
not impressive; however, when firms engaged only
in process innovation or in both types of innova-
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12tion, large firms innovated considerably more than
small-medium ones.
How has this innovative process affected
salaries paid by Spanish manufacturing firms? In
particular, we were interested in knowing if
salaries paid by innovative firms were higher.
Results showed that innovating firms paid higher
wages on average than those offered by non-
innovating firms, and that the same pattern was
found in both groups of firms (SMEs and large
firms). Thus, if firms can grow as the result of
their capacity to develop organizational capabili-
ties, then theory predicts that the salary difference
among innovating firms will be greater in large
firms than in SMEs.
A variance analysis showed that there was
actually a linear relationship between innovation
and size, suggesting the need to study the effect
of innovations on salaries paid in each size group
separately. Although the relationship favored
salaries paid by innovative SMEs instead of
innovating large firms as theory predicted, the
regression model used to estimate the determinants
of salary levels in both groups of companies
showed that in large firms, the firms’ innovating
activity only affected salary variations and not the
levels.
This result showed the difficulties that large
Spanish firms are experiencing in adapting to a
significant change in the competitive environment:
the incorporation of Spanish industry into the
single European market and growing global com-
petition they face from the remaining European
countries as well as other industrialized (recent
GATT agreements) and developing nations
(multifibre agreements, etc.). As Henderson and
Mitchell (1997, p. 7) pointed out, “firms that
develop extensive organizational capabilities find
it more difficult to adapt to major changes in an
industry’s environment than firms that rely on the
capabilities of individuals.” This further demon-
strates the need to regress the wage level on its
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TABLE V
Explanatory Small-Medium Large
variables No. observations: 1482 No. observations: 1684
Dependent variable
lnwage Dlnwage
Innovating firms Non-innovating  Innovating firms Non-innovating 
firms firms firms firms
Specificity of resources
a, b
LNWAGEt – 1 0.653  (2.66) –0.429 (–0.48)  n.a. n.a.
SKILLED 0.611  (1.80) 1.352  (1.51) –0.056 (–0.56) –0.007 (–0.05)
SEMI-SKILLED –0.106 (–0.80) 0.376  (0.89) 0.066  (0.49) –0.012 (–0.10)
SHAREL 0.413  (1.22) 2.004  (1.68) –0.014 (–0.69) 0.024  (0.74)
AVGMBE 0.390  (0.95) 2.094  (1.36) 0.103  (0.82) 0.171  (0.74)
TAXA 0.947  (1.60) 2.453  (1.64) 0.168  (2.31) 0.128  (1.22)
PT 1.393  (1.42) 10.29  (1.68) 0.109  (0.76) 0.281  (2.07)
Specificity of resources 
(model with interactions)
LNWAGEt – 1 0.666  (2.81) –0.385 (–0.47)  n.a. n.a.
SKILLED 0.585  (1.75) 1.568  (1.68) –0.056 (–0.57) –0.019 (–0.14)
SEMI-SKILLED –0.092 (–0.70) 0.328  (0.89) 0.061  (0.46) –0.034 (–0.30)
SHAREL 0.345  (1.12) 1.861  (1.76) –0.014 (–0.69) 0.024  (0.78)
AVGMBE 2.213  (2.07) 7.735  (1.58) 0.226  (1.16) 0.581  (1.35)
TAXA 0.249  (0.61) 0.386  (0.64) 0.113  (1.12) –0.055 (–0.29)
PT 4.901  (2.33) 24.497  (1.68) 0.432  (1.20) 1.334  (1.93)
AVGMBETP –39.541 (–2.21) –163.25  (–1.58) –3.144 (–1.00) –9.977 (–1.64)
a All results are robust to heteroskedasticity.
b T-ratios in brakets.
13determinants to form the econometric model for
SMEs and the wage increase for the group of large
firms. Recent articles in the Spanish press indi-
cated that there are sometimes up to three labor
agreements in a firm that define different wage
scales for the same job and showed that salaries
paid to the oldest employees included organiza-
tional rents from competitive advantages that the
company had lost. Since salaries successfully
resist being reduced, new employees must com-
pensate for the competitive advantage lost.
When analyzing the effects of innovative
activity conducted by Spanish manufacturing
firms, we found that the effect on salaries paid
differed according to company size. In general,
only process innovations were important for
small-medium firms, even though they were more
engaged in product innovations than the large
ones. These results do not support the hypothesis
of Cyert and Kumart (1996) that proposes that
small-medium firms are more interested in product
innovation than the large ones, whereas the reverse
is true as far process innovations are concerned.
Probably this result is due to the fact that Cyert
and Kumart’s model assume that firms are com-
peting in the same final market, whereas the
majority of small-medium Spanish firms possibly
compete as suppliers of large firms. This is a con-
jecture that requires further work.
When we analyzed appropriability conditions,
we found that as far as large firms were concerned,
their salary increase was not influenced by firm’s
market factors, indicating that large firms have the
necessary resources to appropriate the profits
derived from their innovative activities. The
opposite pattern is found in the small-medium
firms group where the market position as well as
the market concentration affected the salaries
positively. However, these results changed when
we took into account the expected interaction
between firm’s internal and market factors. We
found that the impact of innovations on wages
depends on firm’s market structure, and the other
way around, the moderator impact of market
structure on wages depends on the firm’s innova-
tive activity. 
The data shows that market structure negatively
affects the impact of innovations on wages. The
same innovation in a more concentrated market
produces a reduced premium on wages and this
result holds for large as well as for small-medium
firms. Nevertheless, the impact is greater for the
latter group than for large enterprises. In a con-
centrated market small firms are poorly positioned
to appropriate the quasi-rents stemming from their
innovations; in contrast, large firms have more
adequate resources to appropriate this quasi-rents.
On the other hand, the moderation effect of market
concentration is affected by firm’s innovative
behavior. For the same level of market concen-
tration, innovative firms find its impact moderated
by their innovations: the greater the firm’s inno-
vations, the less the impact of market concentra-
tion on wages and the more wages are affected by
innovations. 
We found support for the alternative hypothesis
that suggests that firms grow by developing firm-
specific resources and that innovating firms must
have resources more specific than non-innovating
firms, and this holds regardless of firm’s size. The
entrepreneur must isolate the firm’s internal labor
market from the external market, the result of its
business strategy in order to develop individual
and organizational skills specific to the firm. This
finding suggests that the weight of internal factors
in small-medium and large firms depends on the
innovating behavior of the firm, suggest a way to
solve the contradictory inferences of Nickel et al.
(1994) and Lever and Werkhooven (1996).
Finally, Chow’s test rejects the null hypothesis
that states that there are no significant differences
between the process that generates the salaries in
both groups of firms. Apart from the difficulties
faced by large Spanish manufacturing firms to
adapt to major changes in their competitive envi-
ronment, there are remarkable differences between
the behavior of both large and small-medium
manufacturing enterprises. Not only do their
innovative strategies differ, but also the oppor-
tunity conditions they face, the appropriability
conditions of the economic income stemming from
their innovative activity, and the firm-specific
resources to which they have access. This result
– along with that found by Acs and Audretsch
(1988) when studying the determinants of small-
medium and large firms’ innovations – lends
support to the hypothesis that small-medium
enterprises are not simply scaled-down large firms.
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146.  Conclusions
In this paper we have addressed the issue of wages
determinants as well as analyzed the innovative
behavior of Spanish firms and its impact on wages
paid by SMEs and large firms. We found that
innovative firms paid a wage premium to their
employees, and that this wage premium was
greater in small-medium firms than in large ones,
contrary to what was expected. This unexpected
positive interaction is apparently due to the fact
that large Spanish firms are experiencing diffi-
culties adapting themselves to the new competi-
tive environment.
Small-medium firms’ wages were primarily
influenced by process innovations, contrary to
what was predicted, whereas wages in large firms
were receptive to all kinds of innovations, process,
product and both simultaneously. These influences
were moderated by firm’s competitive strength in
the small-medium firms group, but not in the large
one. 
Even more interesting, the moderator impact of
market factors on wages was seen to depend neg-
atively on a firm’s innovative activity, and the
impact of this innovative activity was found to
depend negatively on a firm’s market structure.
The inferences of the models estimated suggest
that the higher the market concentration the
weaker the appropriability regime, especially for
small-medium firms. However, at the same time,
a firm’s innovations reduce the impact of market
concentration on wages, making innovating firms
more autonomous than the non-innovating ones.
In fact, in order to be able to innovate, firms must
isolate their employees’ salaries from the product
market, results which hold regardless of firm size,
but have a greater impact on the small-medium
group of firms.
This finding suggests that the weight of internal
factors on wages in small-medium and large firms
depends on the innovating behavior of the firm,
suggesting a way to solve the contradictory infer-
ences found recently. Finally, there are remarkable
differences between the behavior of both large and
small-medium manufacturing enterprises, and the
data lend support to the proposition that small-
medium enterprises are not simply scaled-down
large firms. 
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